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Abstract Selectively using Tocqueville, many social scientists suggest that civic participation
increases democracy. We go beyond this neo-Tocquevillian model in three ways. First, to
capture broader political and economic transformations, we consider different types of partic-
ipation; results change if we analyze separate participation arenas. Some are declining, but a
dramatic finding is the rise of arts and culture. Second, to assess impacts of participation, we
study more dimensions of democratic politics, including distinct norms of citizenship and their
associated political repertoires. Third, by analyzing global International Social Survey Programme
and World Values Survey data, we identify dramatic subcultural differences: the Tocquevillian
model is positive, negative, or zero in different subcultures and contexts that we explicate.
Keywords Political culture . Civic participation . Citizenship . Voluntary organizations
The world is changing, arguably more rapidly and profoundly in recent decades than since the
Industrial Revolution. Manufacturing is in deep decline; the percent of manual laborers has fallen
by over half in most industrial countries since the 1950s. This in turn has transformed the political
party system, as unions decline and left parties seek new social bases. All sorts of new civic
groups emerge with global NGOs, the Internet, blogs, and new media/engagement strategies. Yet
most thinking and theorizing about society and politics lags. Most of our models of civic groups,
participation, and democracy come from an industrial era where class politics and party conflict
dominated analysis. And as we think more globally, and look at broader patterns to help reframe
the North American/European experience, what is “established” grows less clear.
Approximately at the same time as the post-industrial political transformation in the West, the
post-1989 transition to democracy in Eastern Europe led analysts to ask a questionmost ignored in
the West—what are the conditions for democracy to flourish? To answer this, political scientists
rediscovered Alexis de Tocqueville. Chief among them was Robert D. Putnam, who in Bowling
Alone enshrined Tocqueville as “patron saint” of the social capital approach to emphasize the civic
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virtues of participation in voluntary social organizations (Putnam 1995). The influence of this
Putnam-Tocqueville model has been substantial. “Trust” and “social capital” have become
buzzwords of early twenty-first century political science. Social capital has been critiqued in many
ways, but one main point here is that its use encouraged analysts to lump together all forms of
organizational membership—unions, churches, and political parties. Thus, “participation” or
“membership” in the exemplary research usually sums up activities of each of these sorts (Verba
et al. 1993; Zukin et al. 2006).
Yet, if we break out participation into its components, we find dramatic differences from the
“bowling alone” story. Voting and participation in general politics has declined in many countries
since the 1980s, as has been widely reported. But barely noted is the rise of the arts and culture in
these same years, even though someWorld Values Survey items suggest massive increases in arts
and culture participation in various countries.1 This is all the more surprising given its ubiquitous
character. From mayors' agendas for urban renewal to the general population's practices, the arts
have become a major area of political interest, economic investment, and self-realization in most
developed countries. This global rise of arts and culture has been largely ignored until now for two
main reasons. On one hand, most studies on the arts are case studies whose authors have not
sought to explore the broader and the political implications of arts participation.2 On the other
hand, leading quantitative studies of arts and culture participation tend to focus on the traditional
arts (live theater, symphony concerts, visiting museums) and omit such new activities as playing
in a small band and many digital arts (graphic design, video, web and interactive design,
animation). Still, there is by no means consensus here: rather many if not most writings on the
arts suggest a decline rather than growth in recent decades. The main resolution of this conflict is
to focus on what types of art and culture.
The more established “high” art like classical music concerts, opera, and museum attendance
show stability or decline in many countries. This has led to a sense of crisis in many arts
organizations, like theU.S.National Endowment for theArtswhich commissionedmultiple studies.
Many showed the classic decline of the “benchmark” high arts, but Novak-Leonard and Brown
(2011) showed high participation and growth in some nontraditional activities. And the French
Ministry of Culture studies document this pattern with more detail, growth in media related film,
music, and more, especially among young persons who create personal entertainment libraries.
These have often beenmissed as they are not classic benchmark items, but many are captured in the
World Values Survey item which permits the respondent to include all arts and culture items in
which she participates.3 We hope to nudge social scientists to catch up to these developments.
1 Data from World Values Survey of national samples of citizens in each country. Question: A066. “Please look
carefully at the following of voluntary organizations and activities and say…which if any do you belong to? Education,
Arts, Music or Cultural Activities.” In Canada, a study on citizens' preferences regarding federal spending points in the
same direction, by finding that one of the few items that show significant change between 1994 and 2010 is support for
“arts and culture,” which climbed from 15 to 30 %. See http://www.queensu.ca/cora/_files/fc2010report.pdf
2 Most studies on the arts are case studies whose authors have not sought to explore the broader and the political
implications of arts participation: see, e.g. Lloyd (2006). Since finding these results in the World Values Survey,
we have looked for other studies that might have reported similar results and found them inconsistent. An
exception is Stolle and Rochon (1998), even though it is limited to three case-studies.
3 The main source of the data used in our statistical analysis is the World Values Survey (1999–2004 wave).
Since our main variable of interest—belong to education, arts, music, or cultural activities—is not included in the
fifth wave of the WVS (2005–2007), we do not use data from that wave. A slightly different model was
implemented on vote (on the social participation bloc, we only had information for religious and cultural groups):
in this case, we used the International Social Survey Programme 2004 data. We also run the same model using as
moderator variables: political cultures, i.e., new political culture, class/party politics, and clientelism and cultural
traditions. We are using secondary data sources of already existent data. This implies that we are not only limited
to a specific period of time, geographical scope, but we are also limited in terms of substantive information
provided by each item surveyed.
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This article discusses the political implications of what we call “the rise of culture.” The rise
of arts and culture, far from being an anomaly, is part and parcel of amuch broader and deeper set
of changes in an emerging form of politics lived by many, especially younger persons. It is a
strategic research site where our litmus test results flag much broader and deeper changes, if we
look. Culture can be about politics as well as personal identity. It can be part of one's job, but is
more likely part of consumption—in a world where political candidates in their campaigns and
actions stress consumption issues increasingly. Arts and culture may have some direct economic
implications, but is more generally about meaning and value. For some in a secular but idea and
image-driven world, music and books and their related activities replace the church and god and
the functions of religion in earlier eras. For young persons breaking with their families and
religious and work backgrounds, a charismatic singer like Madonna or Bruce Springsteen is
more than entertainment. A reading group discussing Nietzsche, Marx, or Baudrillard can
transform its members' thinking. While sympathetic towards the hermeneutically inspired
“cultural turn” in American sociology, we seek to complement it with cross-national survey-
based data, as this is the only way to capture broad, global sociopolitical changes.
Analysts have sought to capture these profound sociopolitical changes with labels like post-
industrial society, the knowledge economy, the third way, neo-liberalism, the creative class or
economy, the consumer society, post-modernism, and more. What these have in common is
stressing that the rules of many past models no long seem to work or demand qualification.
How do any others specifically link to the growing salience of culture and the arts in the past
few decades (see Fig. 1), with structural socioeconomic changes in developed societies around
the world? The answers are clearly diverse but we introduce just one effort to join these
changes in systematic manner, based on our past work. Many others are possible, and we hope
to encourage alternative interpretations that may extend our effort here.
Our past work documented elements of this structural socioeconomic change as the rise of
the “new political culture” (henceforth NPC). This original blend of social liberalism and fiscal
conservatism was first identified in the 1970s urban America. What drives the shift toward the
NPC? Seven general elements have been suggested to help understand the emergence of the
NPC: (1) the classic left–right dimension has been transformed; immigration, women, and
many new issues no longer map onto one single dimension; (2) social and fiscal/economic
issues are explicitly distinguished, work no longer drives all; (3) social and cultural issues like
identity, gender, morality, and lifestyle have risen in salience relative to fiscal/economic issues;
(4) market individualism and social individualism grow: people seek to mark themselves as
distinct from their surroundings; (5) the post-war national welfare state loses ground to
federalist and regionalist solutions; parties, unions, and established churches are often replaced
by new, smaller organizations that may join into social movements; (6) instead of rich vs. poor,
or capitalisms vs. socialism, there is a rise of issue politics—of the arts, the environment, or
gender equality—which may spark active citizen participation on one such issue, but each
issue may be unrelated to the others; and (7) these NPC views are more pervasive among
younger, more educated and affluent individuals, and societies.
Citizens changed first in these respects, and leaders and analysts widely ignored these deep
changes; many still do. But no longer do clientelism and class politics dominate politics as they
did a few decades back. They are challenged by all manner of “reformers,” some of whom
relate to this new political culture. Many local and national political leaders came to adopt a
NPC agenda in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, like Bill Clinton or Tony Blair or Antanas
Mockus. In the 1990s, with the acceleration of economic globalization and the digital
revolution (encompassing technological innovations such as the Internet, mobile phones,
and personal computers), the shift from production to consumption started to capture the
attention of social scientists. Two research questions, in particular, have been pursued. First,
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how and why is the growing prevalence of NPC associated with the replacement of class
politics by issue politics? Second, how and why is the development of the NPC associated with
the rise of consumption politics and the importance of amenities (for instance, in driving local
development)? Behind these questions is the hypothesis that the rejection of hierarchy and
welfare paternalism are in favor of horizontal, issue-politics increase as societies become more
post-materialist, NPC.
The article is organized as follows. We start by describing the analytical model, where we
explain the main assumptions and research hypotheses behind this study. This includes a
justification of our conceptual choices (“Research Design and Data Collection”). Next, we
present our research design. Here, we discuss the main methodological issues we faced in
conducting data analyses (“Findings”). We then present our findings (“Conclusion”).
Specifically, we discuss the impact of our seven “contextual variables” in the relationship
between cultural membership and democratic politics: these include three political cultures
(class politics, clientelism, the new political culture) and four cultural traditions (Eastern
religions, Orthodox Christianism, Catholicism, and Protestantism). Finally, we conclude the
article by pointing out some of the most important implications of the current rise of culture,
both for the purposes of policy making and for the social scientific research of politics.
Analytical Model
As noted above, the simpler patterns that have been widely used (like the decline in voting or
bowling alone) do not hold consistently if we break out participation into separate issue areas,
age groups, and countries. To make sense of these apparent disparities demands a subtler
analytical model. If we look closely, we find that arts and culture are powerfully tied to other
aspects of democratic life. But specifics vary by political cultures that follow disparate rules of
the game. To clarify these patterns, we have extended past modeling about democratic politics
to investigate impacts of culture, as follows. We include the core independent and dependent
variables used by past analysts of citizen participation, but with two critical additions. First, we
break out cultural participation from other content types of social participation—religious,
community, and professional voluntary organizations—and compare its impacts to those of
these other types. Second, we explore how these effects shift across political cultures. These
two changes generate dramatic differences from most past work.
The central path we explore is how cultural participation, here defined as membership in
organizations by type as surveyed in the World Values Surveys (more below), impacts
democratic politics. In turn, our conception of democratic politics includes political practices
(protest, vote), norms of citizenship (citizens' beliefs about what makes one a “good citizen”),
and attitudes (social and political trust). We hypothesize that the impact of cultural membership
on each of these components of democratic politics will not be homogeneous; rather, it will vary
by context. We analyze the impact of cultural membership on democratic politics in several
ways. First, we consider direct effects of the standard socioeconomic variables (sex, age,
education, income, and left–right self-positioning). Second, we compare the impact of cultural
membership with the impact of other types of voluntary organizations, religious, professional,
and community. Next, we analyze how these patterns shift across contexts, political cultures,
and traditions (shown at the bottom of Fig. 2 as interacting with the direct effects). These
illuminate how participating in a cultural organization shifts in meaning and impact on
democratic politics when we move from one context to another. The main data is from
successive cross-sectional national surveys of citizens (more below). As a result, while we
sometime use causal language to simplify exposition, most relations are literally associations.
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Dependent Variables
Let us begin by explaining our conception of democratic politics.4 Much civil society research
has developed under the influence of Putnam's well-known jeremiad: civic participation is said
to be in decline since the 1960s, with serious implications for the health of democracy. We
suggest that this decline covers only part of what has happened in the last half a century.
Another part of the change is a structural differentiation of political participation patterns
accompanying the generational shift, societal value change, and socioeconomic modernization
in dozens of countries around the world since the 1960s. Political repertoires of younger
cohorts are larger than those of their predecessors (e.g., Tilly 2006, pp. 30–59). Our stress on
expanded democratic repertoires joins the structural differentiation to overcome a narrow and
conservative understanding that informed part of the communitarian revival of Tocqueville in
the 1990s. For example, even Welzel, Inglehart, and Deutsch's recent discussion of elite-
challenging repertoires shows a bias towards protest activities. Strikes, which enjoy constitu-
tional protection in virtually all consolidated democracies, are excluded from their model
under the grounds of their alleged “violent” nature (Welzel et al. 2005).
To make our conception of democratic politics more empirically realistic and theoretically
sound, we consider three broad categories of democratic political participation. First, we include
voting and political campaigning,5 the traditional mechanisms of political participation in
representative democracies whose symbolic and non-instrumental functions have become
recently re-appreciated. Second, we explore the work of Putnam, Kenneth Newton, Francis
Fukuyama, and others in considering citizens' attitudes of trust in each other (social or
interpersonal trust) and in the government and other institutions (political trust).6 Third, we
analyze elite-challenging modes of political mobilization.7 This last category includes noncon-
ventional political actions such as participation in demonstrations, signing petitions, writing
political commentary in blogs, or boycotting certain products for ethical reasons. Together with
voting and trust, protest is one of the three dimensions of democratic politics our model seeks to
explain. If we no longer consider the New England, town meeting model of civic participation
as the sole yardstick of democratic politics, but we include all three types just listed, we find no
general decline in political participation. While some forms of political action become less
popular (e.g., voting in certain countries), others are growing, and still others have emerged in
recent years (e.g., political blogs or online petitions) (Dalton 2007). Whereas we try to
overcome the conservative bias of the Putnam-Tocqueville model by enlarging what counts
as democratic participation to include protest activities along with trust and voting, we try to
avoid its parochialism by enlarging the scope of norms of citizenship with which it operates.
Norms of citizenship encompass the values and representations individuals have of their
relation with democratic authorities qua citizens. What are the civic virtues that one should
exhibit to be considered an exemplary citizen? The existing literature, both in political theory
4 We thus restrict our analysis to democratic countries. Our list of 42 democratic countries is based on the Polity
Score. Details of the indicators that constitute the index and the criteria for the classification of countries,
according to the information, are available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
5 “Representative democracy” is an index composed of the following variables: “voted in last election” and
“political action: attend political meetings or rally” (source: International Social Survey Programme 2004).
6 “Social trust” is an index composed by the variables: most people can be trusted; do you think people try to take
advantage of you ((1) “can't be too careful,” (2) “most people can be trusted”). Trust in political institutions
corresponds to the variable confidence in the government (1 “none at all” to 4 “a great deal”) (source: World
Values Survey 1999–2004; see, e.g., Rothstein and Stolle 2008).
7 “Protest” is an index composed by the following variables: political action—sign petition; joining boycotts;
attending lawful demonstrations; joining unofficial strikes; and occupying buildings and factories. They have
three-point scale: 1, “would never do”; 2, “might do”; and 3, “have done” (source:WorldValues Survey 1999–2004).
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and empirical political science, is often insensitive to the variety of normative understandings
regarding citizenship. For example, neo-republicanism often suggests that there is one ideal set
of civic virtues: in the civic republican tradition back to Cicero, Harrington, and Machiavelli,
contemporary political theorists try to deduce the civic virtues that the citizens of contemporary
nation-states should strive toward (e.g., Pettit 2000). In the empirical tradition, albeit less
philosophically sophisticated than their fellow political theorists, political scientists are argu-
ably more sensitive to the heterogeneous nature of the normative fabric of citizenship. Hence,
empirically oriented political scientists such as Dalton (2007) and Denters et al. (2007) identify
several different norms of citizenship in the USA and Europe. We adopt some of those norms
here. Specifically, our model includes the “duty-based,”8 “engagement,”9 and “solidarity”10
norms of citizenship. In addition, we use a second cleavage that has received some theoretical
treatment in recent years (Habermas 1994, 2001). We refer to the distinction between identity
politics and the rule of law, i.e., between “thick” and “thin” norms of citizenship (Lewin-Epstein
and Levanon 2005). Concomitantly, we distinguish between “identity-based” norms of citizen-
ship and “legal-civic” ones.11 By adding an ethnic vs. civic axis to our model, wewish to add an
important corrective to analyses largely based on socioeconomic (civic) norms.
Contextual and Independent Variables
In what follows, we discuss the several contextual12 and independent variables in our model of
the impact of cultural membership in democratic politics, as well as the axioms behind each of
them. The model's first axiom concerns socioeconomic development. Democratic politics is
associated with higher levels of income and education and younger individuals.13 To be able to
8 The “duty-based” norm is an index composed by the following WVS variables: give authorities information to
help justice; future changes: greater respect for authority; national goals: maintaining order in nation; and also by
ISSP 2004 variables: good citizen: always vote in elections, never try to evade taxes, always obey laws, and serve
in the military.
9 The “engagement” norm is an index composed by the following WVS variables: politics important in life;
reasons to help: in the interest of society; discuss political matters with friends and also by ISSP 2004 variables:
good citizen: keep watch in government; active in associations; understand other opinions; choose products with
ethical concerns; and help less privileged in the country/in the world.
10 The “solidarity” norm is an index composed by the following WVS variables: importance of eliminating big
income inequalities; reasons for voluntary work: solidarity with poor and disadvantaged; and ISSP 2004
variables: rights in democracy: government respect minorities; access to adequate standard of living; and
tolerance of disagreement.
11 In the case of the ethnic/civic norm axis (identity and civic norms), we only have information in the World
Values Survey in one variable. In the absence of other options, we maintain it in our analysis in these
circumstances. In the ISSP 2004, there was no information available on this normative dimension. The WVS
variable is: how proud of nationality (civic norm: not very/not at all proud).
12 Both NPC and CP are statistical indexes composed by World Values Survey items (fourth wave, described
below). The different political cultures are multidimensional phenomena so a single indicator cannot measure
them adequately. The means of the NPC and CP indexes were calculated across all respondents. In the analysis,
the filtering criterion was inclusion of the observations that scored above the average value. The results from the
regression estimates were then compared to each dominant political culture. For clientelism, due to the lack of
available survey data, the measure was the index provided by Worldwide Governance Indicators (in this case, all
respondents received the corresponding national figure). We also analyze potential effects of cultural or
civilizational traditions on political behavior and beliefs (a relation extensively studied by S. Eisenstadt).
These traditions correspond to the historically dominant religious culture associated with each country
(Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Eastern religions). Each country in our sample was
classified by its dominant cultural tradition and, in each regression analysis, the countries that did not belong to
the tradition were filtered out.
13 In a recent article, Amy C. Alexander and Christian Welzel similarly point out that “empowering socioeco-
nomic conditions” are conducive to make “people capable of practicing democracy”: see Alexander and Welzel
(2011).
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form an opinion and express it coherently, to show interest in affairs that transcend the immediate
private sphere, and to make political claims in public are all instances of political conduct that
presuppose an educated, motivated, and informed citizenry. The shift from class politics to the
new political culture, or post-materialism in Ronald Inglehart's parlance (1977), was driven by the
economic and social development of democratic countries in the second half of the twentieth
century. As societies become more affluent and democratic regimes consolidate, materialist
concerns with existential security are joined by other post-materialist ones such as quality of life,
social tolerance, and self-expression. This new political culture provides a unique blend of social
liberalism, tolerance, and anti-clientelism with fiscal conservatism. As a result, clientelism and
hierarchical institutions are increasingly rejected: as the 2009 example of Japan's traditional
political system breakdown illustrates, concerns with equality and transparency are gradually
rising on political agendas around the world. Three of the model's contextual variables are thus
political cultures associated with socioeconomic modernization processes: class politics (or
materialism),14 clientelism,15 and the new political culture (or post-materialism).16
The central element of our second axiom, cultural traditions, helps us understand the
shaping influence of broad, civilization value systems on political behavior and beliefs. In
line with the “multiple modernities” paradigm developed by Eisenstadt (2008) and his
associates, these cultural traditions can be traced back to the religious culture that historically
has dominated each country we are studying. We use this as a measure of the multiple
civilizational configurations that compose the world today (e.g., Norris and Inglehart 2004).
Our model includes four of these cultural–civilizational traditions, namely Protestantism,
Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Eastern religions.17 The expectation is that the greater
the influence of principles such as individual autonomy and personal expression in a certain
cultural tradition, the more likely it is for it to be associated with norms of citizenship and types
of political participation that emphasize critical engagement and creative self-realization. To be
concrete, we expect, for instance, that cultural membership in Protestant countries to be more
highly correlated with the engagement norm of citizenship and protest types of participation
than in countries where the dominant cultural tradition is Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity,
or a Eastern religion such as Buddhism or Confucianism.
Our third axiom refers to the political benefits of individual membership in voluntary associ-
ations. We focus on this particular mode of civic involvement (and not, say, in active participation,
volunteering, or donation of money) for theoretical and methodological reasons. There are several
explanations for the positive impact of cultural membership on democratic politics. One is
suggested by practice theory. In Distinction, Pierre Bourdieu notes the virtuous relationship
between types of newspaper reading and political engagement, as Mike Savage et al. in Culture,
Class, Distinction aptly recall (Savage et al. 2009, pp. 95–96, 106). This was not, however,
Bourdieu's primary interest. Rather, Bourdieu's main goal is to articulate a theory of social
stratification based on aesthetic taste: “art and cultural consumption are predisposed, consciously
14 Class/party politics is an index composed by the WVS variables: work orientations: compared with leisure;
materialism orientations; and society aimed: extensive welfare vs. low taxes.
15 Clientelism is measured by Worldwide Governance Indicators, which include control of corruption; rule of law;
regulatory quality; government effectiveness; political stability and absence of violence; and voice and accountabil-
ity. More information is available here: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/
EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,,menuPK:1740542~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:1740530,00.html.
16 New political culture is an index composed by the WVS variables: being with people with different ideas;
choose products with environmental concerns; and post-materialism four-item scale (maintain order; greater
democracy; curb inflation; greater freedom of speech), in which items 1 and 3 express a materialist orientation,
whereas 2 and 4 indicate post-materialist values.
17 In the case of cultural traditions (Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox Christianity, and Eastern religions), each
respondent is linked to each one of these four types depending on the dominant cultural tradition in his/her country.
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and deliberately or not, to fulfill a social function of legitimating social differences” (Bourdieu
1979, p. 7). Bourdieu's elite-mass model of cultural taste has not gone unchallenged, however.
First, as Laurent Fleury notes, by according to the experience of the working classes the
kind of attention previously reserved to the culture of the highly literate and by taking an
interest in design, advertizing, audiovisual products, the transmission and exploitation of
knowledge, as well as recreational activities, leisure, and tourism, “cultural studies” played a
part in promoting the ubiquity of the “cultural” (Passeron et al. 2003; Fleury 2013, p. 49).
Second, Bourdieu has been challenged by the work of Peterson and Simkus on “culture
omnivores” (Peterson and Simkus 1992), which showed that people of higher social status were
not averse to participation in activities associated with popular culture. Indeed, high status
people were adding practices and cultural forms to their cultural repertoire at an accelerating
rate: they were omnivores because they were developing a taste for everything. Research on
cultural omnivores focuses on the individuals and their practices, while our past work has
focused instead on their political culture (NPC). Despite the different analytical focuses, we are
both tapping into the same rising pattern: cultural omnivores, who tend to adopt a NPC, “tend to
be more politically engaged” (Chan 2013). Consistent with DiMaggio (1996), Chan uses the
British Household Panel Survey to suggest that “omnivores are quite distinctive in their social
and political attitudes. Compared with visual arts inactives, omnivores are more trusting and
risk taking. They are also more supportive of the supranational European Union, and they tend
to eschew subnational and ethnic identities, which suggests a more open and cosmopolitan
outlook. Omnivores are more egalitarian in their gender role attitudes, and they are more liberal
on homosexuality. Omnivores are greener regarding the environment and climate change which
can be interpreted as them having more trust in scientific authority” (Chan 2013, p. 29).
However, Chan, apart from the observation that it is related to social status (but not social
class), provides no explanation for these political effects of being a cultural omnivore.
A different line of inquiry into the political effects of cultural consumption lies in
the intersection between American pragmatism and Frankfurt school critical theory,
namely Axel Honneth's attempt to reconnect Mead and Hegel in the form of a theory
of recognition. François Matarasso, the author of the influential albeit methodologi-
cally controversial 1997 Use or Ornament? The Social Impact of Participation in the
Arts (1997), has recently suggested that Axel Honneth's theory of recognition provides
an explanation for his findings (2010, p. 5).
To better appreciate the pragmatic origins of Honneth's proposal, consider Belfiore's and
Bennett's The Social Impact of the Arts. An Intellectual History. From classic Greece and turn
of the century American pragmatism, they review many theories that suggest the arts' positive
impact in promoting “man's sense of well-being and his health, as well as his happiness”
(Belfiore and Bennett 2008, p. 102). They cite contemporary studies that show a link between
cultural participation and longevity. While these studies have not established a causal relation
between cultural participation and the beneficial physiological processes associated with
longevity, they suggest nonetheless that if democracy is not merely a form of government,
but a “way of life, social and individual” (Dewey [1937] 2008, LW11, p. 217), then it depends
on the widespread participation of a community in a dialogue over its ends, the quality of
which would depend upon the quality of that community's democratic culture. To improve
democratic culture, the pragmatist would explore ways to improve public deliberation and
civic participation, which would include education and the arts. In short, cultural participation
promotes the sort of active, creative training by “spectators” which democracy needs to
flourish if it is conceived of as a way of life.
A final possible explanation for the positive effects of cultural membership on democratic
politics is that the political is itself aesthetic in nature. The idea that the political is aesthetic has
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been explored by authors such as Hannah Arendt in Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy
(1982), where she describes the human condition of action as the “political” that is both
existential and aesthetic, and Jacques Rancière in Disagreement (2004). By contrast, echoing
Nietzsche, Max Weber suggests that aesthetics is close to eroticism and largely follows
subjective, deep dynamics relatively distinct from the economy and politics.
Consider empirical studies on the relationship between cultural membership and political
participation. Several authors suggest that the more intense forms of civic participation are
more strongly correlated with political action (Rosenblum 1998; Wilson 2000). Our hypothesis
here, following Tocqueville, is that social participation fosters political participation. However,
pace Putnam but still following Tocqueville, we qualify this claim: we presuppose that not all
types of voluntary organizations are equally beneficial to democratic life. Some, in fact, can be
harmful (de Tocqueville 1945), while others might be irrelevant. The dynamic between
different types of civic organizations is important to our purposes as we wish to find out the
extent to which each of these types is correlated with the several dimensions of democratic life.
Our model distinguishes four content types of voluntary organizations, namely religious,
professional, communitarian, and cultural18 (Fig. 3). Each of these four types constitutes
an independent variable in our block on “social participation” (see Fig. 2 above). Our aim
is to see whether membership in distinct types of voluntary associations is associated
with different citizenship norms and stimulates different political practices. Inspired by a
wealth of evidence suggesting that arts organizations are among the most potent “schools
of democracy,” we want to test whether membership in cultural associations has a
significant, distinct impact in democratic politics from membership in other types of
voluntary associations.
Research Design and Data Collection
Our analysis aimed to produce a rigorous quantitative documentation of the context-mediated
impact of cultural membership in democratic politics. To test our model, we have used data
from leading international surveys: the World Values Survey (WVS, 1999–2004 waves) and
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 2004). The sample of our study is composed
of cross-sectional observations for 42 democratic countries during the period 1999–2004. We
test our model with ordinary least squares (OLS) and hierarchical linear modeling (HLM)
regressions. To capture intervening factors at the country level, we used the Gini index,
education (gross enrollment ratio), and cultural trade as percentage of the GDP (see Fig. 2).19
18 In the case of WVS, the variables accounting for “voluntary organizations membership” are as follows: belong
to community, religious, arts, and professional voluntary organizations: 1 “not mentioned,” 2 “belong”; mem-
bership in religious and cultural voluntary organizations in the case of ISSP 2004. We compare cultural
organizations with community, religious, and professional associations because these were the main types of
social organizations chosen by Putnam to illustrate his claims in Bowling Alone (see Putnam 2000, pp. 48–92).
19 To account for the hierarchical nature of our data, we employed multilevel regression analysis using, for the
national level, United Nations Development Programme data for the Gini index, education gross enrollment ratio,
cultural trade as percentage of the GDP (see http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm), and WVS data (membership
in voluntary organizations and socio-demographic variables as controls) for the individual level. The statistical
tests applied to the model used WVS data (1999–2004 wave). A slightly different model was implemented on
voting as ISSP only has information regarding religious and arts groups (not on community and professional
voluntary associations). Except for this difference, the same model was applied to voting. As Fig. 2 indicates, we
included socioeconomic variables as direct effects and as moderator variables (one at a time in seven separately
estimated models), three political cultures (“new political culture,” class/party politics, clientelism) and four
cultural traditions (Protestantism, Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity and Eastern religions).
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Most arts participation studies are local case studies, small-N comparisons, or national level
analysis20 (usually conducted by national authorities, such as Ministries of Culture). In turn,
civil society and participation research, as far as we know, has failed to systematically explore
the impact of membership in cultural organizations in democratic politics. The present
research, by contrast, uses cross-national survey data because this is the only way to reconnect
these two lines of inquiry – membership in cultural voluntary organizations and democratic
practices and values – on a global level.
The collection of valid comparative data faced several challenges. The first concerned
the availability of data: despite the growth in survey data collection in “non-western”
countries in recent years, there is significantly more data for “western” societies. To
measure change in arts and culture, the number of countries was reduced to those in the
1999-2004 WVS waves (and the ISSP 2004 wave for voting).21 Other challenges include
the potential impact of time and the identification of trends in the data; the
operationalization of “thick” concepts as political cultures (e.g., the new political culture)
and cultural traditions (e.g., Protestantism); and the more general reciprocity22 and
omitted-variable bias. In addition, there are diverse potential threats to the reliability of
measurement (e.g., Jackman 2008). We also faced operationalization challenges of all
secondary analyses: limitations in geographical scope, time period, and, more important-
ly, the wording of each survey item. A case in point is one of our key variables:
membership in cultural or artistic voluntary organizations. The only available item in
the WVS is question A066, which reads “Please look carefully at the following of
voluntary organizations and activities and say…which if any do you belong to? [the list
included] Education, Arts, Music or Cultural Activities.” Aware of the potential mea-
surement error due to the inclusion of educational organizations like PTAs in this item,
we recomputed the results for parents and nonparents of school-age children. There were
minimal differences.23
Findings
We test our model of the impact of cultural membership in democratic politics in two
successive steps. First, we run multilevel regression analyses in order to estimate the
impact of the individual and contextual levels in predicting participation, attitudes, and
norms of citizenship in democratic countries around the world. The results corroborate
20 One other concern relates to the fact that in each country, the levels of culture membership are a relatively
small part of the national sample. Our solution was not to conduct single country analyses, but to group countries
by cultural type, which raised the Ns.
21 This is a particularly sensitive issue as we focus on a broad population of cases - democratic countries - in
diverse political and/or cultural contexts. See, e.g., King et al. (2004).
22 We are aware of the potential reciprocity bias that exists in the general model we are testing—our general
model analyzes if social participation impacts democratic politics, but the inverted relation might also hold. We
tested this possibility and, in fact, the levels of political participation, trust, and the adherence to norms of
citizenship predict membership in voluntary organizations. The variation explained by these models—measured
by the adjusted R2—is inferior to our model of interest.
23 In addition, in order to test for the possible contamination of the measurement of arts participation by
educational organizations we have run OLS regressions using the Citizenship, Democracy and Involvement
Survey andWorld Values Survey data. We compared the results of our predictors of interest - only for the US (the
CID questionnaire was only applied in the US): ‘member: cultural or hobby activities organization’ (CID, 2005)
and ‘belong to education, arts, music or cultural activities’ (WVS, 1999-2004). The findings show that the results
for the model with the item without reference to education (CID) do not diverge significantly from derived from
the WVS: both are positive and significant predicting, in the case, protest.
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our expectations: for the general model, cultural membership is the best predictor of
protest activities among voluntary organization membership, alongside the educational
level attained (see Tables 1 and 3). This pattern holds for the political cultures and
cultural traditions analyzed, especially in the new political culture and Protestant
contexts (Table 4). This is the first dramatic result that illustrates the core point of
the paper: cultural membership has far more impact than past work has identified, and
it is new and powerful.24 Any new variable that rivals education is major news for
survey researchers generally.
The second dramatic finding from our empirical work is most simply illustrated in a
set of nine small bar charts that contrast the impact of arts participation across contexts
(Fig. 4).25 These contexts are political cultures and world areas (specifically the seven at
the base of Fig. 2, like class politics and clientelism). These show clearly that the impacts
of the arts vary substantially across our contexts, five of which are graphed in Fig. 4.
These are the core findings that we interpret in the rest of the paper, discussing how and
why the impacts of cultural membership vary so powerfully across the different contexts.
In what follows, we focus on each specific context successively, beginning with the three
political cultures—class politics, clientelism, and the NPC—and moving on to the
cultural traditions, from countries whose dominant religious traditions are one of the
Eastern religions to countries with a predominant Orthodox Christian, Catholic, and
Protestant orientation.
The Appendix shows details of the multilevel regression analysis, plotting standard-
ized regression coefficients of arts participation, by context. We computed both OLS and
multilevel estimates, which are generally similar. We often refer to the regressions of the
impact of four types of social participation on each component of democratic politics
(dependent variables), controlling the socioeconomic descriptors (Table 4). Space limits
prohibit presenting all 14 tables from the two types of estimates and seven contexts. The
first two of the 14 full tables are presented; the others are available upon request.
Methodologically, we stress the interaction effects shown in our basic path diagram
(Fig. 3), especially how and why results, especially concerning the arts, vary from one
context to another. We comment on the most salient and distinctive results, especially as
they vary across contexts.
Three Types of Political Culture: Different Arts Impact
We begin with the analysis of how political cultures mediate the impact of cultural membership
in democratic practices and values. As noted above, political cultures are not associated with a
particular set of countries. Rather, they transverse countries, regions, and cities. Individuals
may well adhere to a certain kind of political culture despite (or, sometimes, because) they
happen to live in a setting where other values are dominant. For this reason, we measure
political cultures with survey items posed to individual citizens.26 The basic question (null
24 In Table 4, a clear pattern emerges from the results: cultural membership is a significant predictor of political
participation, attitudes, and norms of citizenship in most contexts analyzed. Note also the coefficients for arts
participation predicting Protest in Table 1 (new political culture context) and Table 2 (class politics context). In
Table 3, we present the results for the representative democracy component. Cultural membership is the only
indicator that shows significant regression coefficients throughout the contexts.
25 We also implemented a test of between-subjects effects to see if each context had a different effect on each of
our dependent variables. Result: they indicated a significant context effect (for example, impact of different
political cultures on protest: F (2, 52,979)=31.86, p<0.001).
26 Except in the case of clientelism.
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hypothesis) here is: to assess the political implications of my membership in a cultural
organization, does it matter which sort of basic values regarding social and economic change
I subscribe to? Our findings indicate impact (Fig. 4). In some political cultures, cultural
membership fosters certain democratic practices and civic norms, while promoting different
ones in others.
Class Politics
Consider the class politics context. This context is ideal—typically characterized by hierar-
chical institutions (the Church, political parties, and unions), materialist values (related to
security and economic development), and a model of citizenship defined by the fulfill-
ment of civic duties such as serving in the military and paying taxes and receiving class-
party-driven state benefits. Our aim here is to discuss how and why belonging to a
cultural organization influences political beliefs and conduct in this specific context. We
build on recent work on class politics such as Evans (1999), Clark and Lipset (2001), and
Achterberg (2006).
The most interesting finding here is that cultural membership increases voting turnout
(Table 3). This is the only context in which this happens. Why does arts participation in class
politics contexts lead one to vote, while it suppresses voting in other contexts? A political
cultural explanation is that in class politics contexts, the “rules of the game” distinctly favor
turnout more than in other contexts. The role of collective organizations in mobilizing turnout
seems key: unions, stronger political parties, and civic groups closely tied to political parties.
These are the classic organizations that mobilize voters in cities and countries with stronger
class politics, like the Scandinavian countries and, in the past, most Southern European
countries and Latin America (e.g., Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). These organizations remind
their members that voting is important, discuss elections in meetings and newsletters,
often monitor who has not voted on election day, then visit individuals to remind them to
vote, and drive them personally to the polls. This highly labor-intensive campaign work
is ideologically consistent with the collective ethos of labor/left party/collective church
traditions. These have traditionally also been the largest and best staffed organizations
involved in electoral politics. They are stronger on the left/popular side than among
conservative parties in most class politics societies (Clark and Hoffman-Martinot 1998).
Here, more institutional forms of political participation, like voting and political
campaigning, are conceived of as legitimate, effective means of exercising and claiming
citizenship rights, no less than protest activities themselves, hence the positive associa-
tion of cultural membership with both voting and protest in class politics contexts
(Table 2).
If, in materialist class politics contexts, cultural membership seems to foster turnout, the
same is not true of other aspects of democratic politics. One such dimension is trust, both in
other persons and in the government: in both cases, the impact of arts participation is not
significant. Similarly, class politics contexts seem to act as a sort of “buffer zone,” which limits
the impact of cultural membership on the norms of citizenship: under class politics, this impact
is weaker than in most other contexts. By contrast, the impact of more hierarchical civic
organizations such as the Church is strong in this context: it is a significant predictor of both
the duty-based and of the identity norms of citizenship, as well as of social and political trust.
Cultural membership in class politics contexts, dominated by hierarchical institutions and
materialist concerns, seems to have somewhat mixed political consequences—if it fosters
voting (and, to a lesser extent, protest), its impact in other dimensions of democratic life is
negligible compared to other predictors.
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Clientelism
Empirically often overlapping class politics, clientelism is a second political culture whose
mediating influence between arts participation and democracy we wish to test.27 Cultural
membership here has markedly different political consequences than in NPC and class politics.
Two results immediately distinguish clientelism. First, cultural membership is here associated
with duty-based and identity models of citizenship. In the other cultural contexts, artistic
voluntary participation tends to “prevent” one from equating citizenship with serving in the
military or paying taxes, a duty-based understanding of the civic bond. However, in a
clientelist political culture, this relation becomes positive—here if one is a member of, say, a
book club, one is more likely to endorse duty-based norms of citizenship. Confirming the
general legitimacy of duty in this political culture, the duty-based norm is affirmed by
respondents higher in education, income, and membership in professional associations. In
addition,thisistheonlycontextinwhichbelongingtoanartsassociationispositivelycorrelated
withanidentitaryunderstandingofthepoliticalbond.28Thisflows,webelieve,fromthestrength
ofpersonalistic ties inaclientelistcontext,affirmingits impactevenasdeeplyasone'spersonal
identity.Second,ifonebelongstoanartsorganizationinaclientelistcontext,itisnotmorebutless
likelythatthecitizenwilltakepartinmanifestationsorotherprotestactivitiesandendorseanorm
ofcitizenshipassociatedwithrightsclaiming(Table4).29
These two results combined are nothing short of remarkable. Attesting to the importance of
context, these are clear examples of how the same social practice (belonging to a cultural
organization) can entail profoundly different political implications. These findings powerfully
reinforce our general point that the experience of belonging to a cultural organization acquires
distinct political meanings in different contexts: of all political cultures discussed in this paper,
clientelism is the only one in which the impact of cultural membership on protest activities, as
well as on the engagement and the legal-civic norms of citizenship, is negative. This reverses
in the next context.
New Political Culture
In a new political culture context, not only is the impact of cultural membership on protest
activities positive, its impact is also the strongest among all political cultures (Table 4).30 Why?
Recall that the NPC is an emerging political culture that combines socially liberal attitudes
(say, a pro-choice position) with a fiscally conservative agenda. As such, the citizen-oriented
individualism associated with post-materialism tends to reject the hierarchical and bureaucratic
state apparatus. This egalitarian individualism seems to be a contributing factor for the
predisposition of individuals engaged in cultural activities, more than in class politics or
clientelist contexts, to engage in elite-challenging activities. In other words, if one is critical
of big government and supports gay marriage, while being a member of a poetry reading club,
27 Clientelism is a context constructed not from information obtained by means of cross-national surveys (which
did not include “clientelist” items), as in the case of the other contexts, but from national information gathered by
the World Bank.
28 Standardized regression coefficients (arts membership in clientelist context predicting solidarity norm of
citizenship): β=0.098 (p<0.001).
29 Standardized regression coefficients (arts membership in clientelist context predicting protest, engaged norm
of citizenship): β=−0.029 (p<0.001), β=−0.037 (p<0.001).
30 NPC contexts show significantly higher impacts of cultural membership than of the other types of apolitical
associations on protest activities. This holds true for the three political cultures, NPC, class politics, and
clientelist, where cultural membership is a better predictor of protest than any other type of organizational
participation (religious, community, or professional).
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this will probably translate into political terms as a predisposition to, say, sign petitions and to
adopt a rights-claiming attitude. Interestingly, it will not foster as much trust in other persons as
in the government. These findings not only corroborate past work suggesting that social and
political trust are different attitudes explained by different variables (e.g., Coleman 1988;
Newton 2001), but also reflect the nature of this specific political culture, i.e., a combination of
socially liberal attitudes with fiscal conservatism that is particularly salient in large, cosmo-
politan urban settings (e.g., Boshcken 2003).
Four Cultural Traditions/Civilizations
Our focus so far on political cultures could lead some to consider either that behind our model
lies some sort of evolutionary framework, guiding the analyst from the class politics and
clientelism of the past to the NPC of today's global cities and cosmopolitan democrats, or that
we are solely concerned with the socioeconomic processes of societal change. Both inferences
would be wrong. Although we do not deny the profound impact of socioeconomic change in
individuals' attitudes and practices, we also attend to possible effects of “civilizations,” broad
sociocultural religious patterns. In addition, we do not equate modernization with westerniza-
tion, i.e., the gradual diffusion of western values and institutional solutions across the globe.
Our understanding of modernization processes, on the contrary, is that of a plurality of
appropriations and reinventions of the original, western European modern project. These
responses to modernity can be seen as expressions of different civilizations. This is why, in
addition to political cultures associated with socioeconomic change, our model includes
cultural–civilizational traditions. Their religious–cultural cores are not reducible to socioeco-
nomic concerns (Eisenstadt 2008). Here, cultural traditions refer to the religious-based cultures
that have been historically predominant in each country. As such, cultural traditions refer to
specific groups of countries.31 Our findings below thus concern the mediating role of some of
major cultural traditions for the impact of arts membership on democratic politics (Fig. 4 and
Table 4).
Eastern Religions
A major cultural tradition is formed by eastern religions, which include, among others,
Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism.32 In the countries where these cultural traditions are
predominant (South Korea, Japan), or at least occupy a prominent position (India), the central
finding is the individualist and engaged political repercussions of cultural membership. Korean
reading club members, for instance, are more likely to engage in protest activities and endorse
a model of citizenship that emphasizes engagement. And the more educated they are, the
more likely this is to occur.33 Furthermore, cultural membership seems to be part of an
expanded scope of individuality at the expense of solidarity. First, cultural membership
31 Using religion as a prime historical indicator of traditional basic values and culture is classic in social science,
from Max Weber's works on sociology of religion (1958, 1964) to Talcott Parsons (1951), to Henri Mendras
(1971), and even Daniel Bell (1973).
32 Due to data availability, this last context is analyzed only for three countries (India, Japan, and South Korea).
Future waves of the World Value Survey and similar cross-national surveys should try to enlarge the number of
countries from this part of the world.
33 “More educated” refers here to the positive and statistically significant regression coefficient correspondent to
the direct effect of the variable predicting the dependent variables (concerning the highest level of education
attained by the respondent).
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in this context decreases one's solidarity towards the worst-off. Second, and more
important, of all cultural traditions, this is the only one in which to belong to a chorus
society or a theater group is unrelated to increased trust in other individuals. In these
countries, the sources of social trust are elsewhere, namely in a left-wing ideological
stance, higher income, and being older.
Orthodox Countries
Moving now to majority Orthodox Christian countries, namely Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova,
and the Ukraine, one cannot ignore the fact that all were under communist rule for much of the
second half of the twentieth century. The most striking result concerning the political impact of
cultural membership here is its passive outlook—something not be found in any other context.
There is no correlation between, say, being a member of a chorus in Romania and endorsing a
rights-claiming conception of citizenship rights. Similarly, cultural membership has the least
impact on protest activities. Furthermore, signaling perhaps a divorce between arts participa-
tion and institutional politics in this context, the only kind of trust promoted by this specific
sort of social participation is social, not political trust (Table 4). The impact of religious
membership, in turn, is almost residual in these Orthodox countries: there is only a weak
negative correlation between this sort of social participation and the duty-based norm of
citizenship, perhaps attesting to the more complex role of religion combined with the com-
munist past.
Catholic Countries
Consider next the two cultural traditions historically most influential in western democ-
racies—Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. In majority of Catholic countries, a
cultural tradition that includes Southern European and Latin American countries,34 the
political impact of cultural membership assumes yet another configuration. The most
salient finding is the anti-hierarchical and libertarian political meaning, absent in NPC or
Protestant contexts. Two results illustrate. First, cultural membership is negatively
correlated with voting (Table 3).35 This is noteworthy insofar as this is the only context
in our study where this occurs: in all other contexts, cultural membership fosters voting
and political campaign work. And only in NPC contexts is belonging to an arts
association more strongly correlated with joining a demonstration or signing a petition
than in Catholic countries (Table 4).36 Second, turning to political beliefs, cultural
membership is negatively correlated with the duty-based norm of citizenship: if I belong
to, say, a theater group in Spain, I will more likely reject equating citizenship with
paying taxes and identify it instead with street demonstrations.37
These are among the most interesting and unexpected findings our model has pro-
duced. We have already seen how contexts such as the NPC, class politics, or clientelism
shape the political consequences of cultural membership. The significant differences
34 The complete list of major Catholic countries included in our analysis is Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, El Salvador, France, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Peru,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Uruguay.
35 Standardized regression coefficients (cultural membership predicting voting): β=−0.028 (p<0.001).
36 Standardized regression coefficients (cultural membership predicting protest): β=0.057 (p<0.001).
37 Standardized regression coefficients (cultural membership predicting duty and engaged norm): β=−0.047
(p<0.001) and 0.025 (p<0.001).
Culture on the Rise
found among all these contexts share one thing—they are consistent with the cultural
patterns38 prevalent in each context. But Catholicism seems to enhance a different
contextual effect: the political impact of cultural membership is not consistent with the
broad cultural traits of the Roman Catholic Church, but a reaction to them. Following
this interpretation (not unique to us, except for the arts data), the anti-hierarchical and
libertarian political consequences of cultural membership is an indication that members
in cultural associations in countries like Spain, Portugal, or Poland find in these organi-
zations an outlet providing a critical distance from the socially conservatives of the
Catholic tradition.
Protestant Countries
Several Catholic effects reverse in majority Protestant countries.39 Here, increased support for
protest activities,40 for engagement and legal-civic norms of citizenship, and for increased
social and political trust,41 arts participation shows positive impacts—all in line with
Protestantism's cultural legacy. That is, principles like individual autonomy and personal
expression not only support norms of citizenship and types of political participation empha-
sizing critical engagement and creative self-realization, but they give this cultural tradition a
distinctive flair. It differs from NPC contexts, for example, in that individuals in Protestant
countries joining cultural organizations are even less likely to associate citizenship with
serving in the military or paying taxes. And it differs from class politics in that political
impacts of cultural membership are substantially stronger. Imagine a literary club member in
the Netherlands. Our findings suggest that he would be significantly inclined to conceive of
citizenship as claiming rights. He would also strongly reject civic models associated with
fulfilling duties or showing solidarity for the most vulnerable members of society.42 But now
consider that our imaginary Dutch bibliophile has a materialist, class politics orientation. In
this case, as we saw above in considering the buffer zone effect of class politics, the political
impact of his cultural membership would be much weaker. To sum up, belonging to a literary
club or a choral society in a Protestant country makes one more prone to trust other fellow
citizens and the government, to object to models of citizenship based either on the fulfillment
of duties or in solidaristic values, while supporting protest activities and norms of citizenship
based on a legal-civic, rights-claiming understanding of the good citizen.
This makes the Protestant cultural tradition different from all the others considered so far. In
Catholic countries, cultural membership is associated with anti-hierarchical attitudes and prac-
tices; in Orthodox countries, it promotes social trust; in Eastern religious countries, it has
individualistic and engaged political implications; in NPC contexts, it is linked to protest activities
and the engagement norm; in class politics contexts, to voting and political campaign; and in
clientelist settings, to the duty-based and identity citizenship norms. One type of social partici-
pation, seven cultural contexts and seven different political consequences, if put in a word, would
38 “Cultural determinants” refer to structural features of each context, in the sense of Raymond Boudon's
“operative” definition of structure (see Boudon 1971).
39 The complete list of major Protestant countries in our analysis is Australia, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Great Britain, and the USA.
40 Still, it has to be said that the sources of political trust are conservative and hierarchical, i.e., low income, right-
wing self-positioning, and belonging to a religious organization most increase trust.
41 Standardized regression coefficients (cultural membership predicting protest activities, social trust, and
engagement norm of citizenship): β=0.029 (p<0.001), β=0.056 (p<0.001), and β=0.023 (p<0.001).
42 Standardized regression coefficients (cultural membership predicting duty and solidarity norms of citizenship):
β=−0.057 (p<0.001), β=−0.056 (p<0.001).
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be culture matters. Culture matters, first of all, because it is on the rise globally. Culture matters
also because of all types of voluntary associations here considered, cultural membership has the
most significant political impacts. And culture matters further in that these political impacts are
is significantly mediated by different political cultures and cultural–civilizational traditions.
These last two findings combined seem to vindicate our efforts at building a theoretical model
of the political meaning of the rise of culture, i.e., how and why, in multiple contexts around the
globe, is cultural membership associated with democratic values and practices.
Conclusion
This paper documents the rise of culture and arts participation as a dramatic exception to the
widely held view that we are increasingly bowling alone, i.e., that civic activity is declining. In the
Netherlands, the USA, Canada, and Scandinavia, arts and culture participation has tripled or
doubled from 1981 to 2004. Our finding derives from examining civic participation items for
issue specificity, rather than implicitly assuming that issues are not distinct (the working rule of
most participation research). We next explored interrelations between arts and culture participa-
tion and several measures of democratic politics, finding that they vary considerably by context.
This sharply contradicts and qualifies the generality of the Tocqueville/Putnam hypothesis. The
core of the paper interprets differences by context. As far as we know, this is the first attempt to
identify and discuss the political consequences of cultural membership on a global scale.
The implications for democratic politics of nonpolitical associational life are a classic theme
in the social sciences. Using survey-based cross-national data, we analyzed specifically the
impact of being a member of a cultural organization on various indicators of democratic
politics—from practices like voting or protest, attitudes toward political institutions, to beliefs
regarding citizenship. Our specific findings bolster the hypothesis that the recent rise of culture
has important political consequences. These consequences, however, are neither limited to a
certain component of democratic politics—say, the representative democracy component vs.
elite-challenging activities—nor are they homogenous across contexts (transnational or country
level). Our model has shown how the impact of cultural membership on the different compo-
nents of democratic politics is profoundly shaped by the concrete cultural contexts in which
individuals live.While in some it drives one away from traditional party politics, in others, it has
the exact opposite effect, leading one to vote and participate in political campaigns.
Besides significant political implications, the rise of culture also has important policy
implications. As local governments around the world have shown since the mid-1970s, policy
innovation in the arts and culture is a powerful political instrument: from the strategic electoral
use of humor and irony to ambitious municipal plans of urban renovation associated with
cultural events or institutions, in such disparate locations as Bogota, Colombia, Naples, Italy, or
Chicago, USA, there is overwhelming evidence of the rise of culture in local policy making.43
Bogotá, Naples, and Chicago are among the many sources of a new style of leadership and
citizenship, new modes for engaging citizens that often conflict with the Tocqueville-Putnam
tradition. Rather than focusing on the Kiwanis Club or the League of Women Voters, mayors in
Naples, Chicago, and especially Bogotá have developed highly popular, symbolic leadership,
joined in specific actions, as alternative modes of governance that work (instead of the classic
civic group). These alternative modes of urban governance work in part since they are founded
on a base of distrust, alienation, and cynicism that makes the Tocqueville model distinctly more
43 The importance of arts and culture in contemporary urban policy is discussed in the very recent work of
Grodach and Silver (2012, p. 13).
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difficult to construct. In the last few years, we have collaborated with several Latin Americans,
Italians, and Spaniards to document and generalize the lessons from Bogota, Naples, and even
Chicago in a manner that they might be applicable to situations such as the civic vacuum found
in Mexico City as well as some LA (and Chicago) neighborhoods. From this perspective, UN-
supported initiatives like the 2004 “Agenda 21 for culture” are but a high-level, institutional
response to the accumulated experience of dozens of local government initiatives around the
world that had been using arts and culture to foster social, economic, and political development
for decades.
Culture and arts participation should be taken seriously for all the above reasons. More
people have life experiences shaped by it; as “schools of democracy,” to paraphrase
Tocqueville, cultural organizations nurture a wider range of civic virtues than most other types
of associations surveyed, at least the standard types in the World Values Surveys; and one can
only begin to understand the political significance of the rise of culture if cultural diversity is
adequately accounted for. There are then good reasons to place culture high on the research
agenda of the social sciences.
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Appendix
Fig. 1 Rising membership of cultural activity groups. Note: Percentage of individuals in each country sample
who belong to education, arts, music or cultural activities organizations in each WVS wave and total variation
(1981–1984; 1989–1993; 1994–1999)
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Fig. 2 Path diagram of core model. Note: The paths show direct effects from the two boxes of variables on the
left hand side. The bottom boxes with their paths leading to circled arrows indicate interaction or mediated
effects, which shift the paths from the left hand side. How and why these mediated effects differ is the main focus
of subsequent sections of the paper
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Fig. 3 Membership in voluntary organizations, 1981–2004. Note: Comparison of levels of membership in
voluntary organizations (question: “Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and
activities and say… which if any do you belong to?”). WVS data (1981–1984 and 1999–2004 wave)
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Fig. 4 Arts participation predicting democratic politics, by context (multilevel regression analysis)
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Table 1 Multilevel regression analysis: predictors of democratic politics (new political culture context)
Participation Attitudes Norms of citizenship
Protest Trust: political
institutions
Social
trust
Engaged Duty Solidarity Civic
Level 1
Sex (female) −0.042*** 0.049 0.075* 0.014 0.012 −0.041 0
Age 0 −0.026 0.066* −0.016 −0.007 0.028 0.012*
Educational level 0.125*** 0.001 0.040 −0.07 −0.003 0.070 0.007
Income 0.030*** −0.013 0.038 −0.09 −0.002 0.002 0.005
Community 0.009* −0.002 −0.010 −0.004 0.011* −0.004 −0.004*
Religious −0.013* 0.007 −0.035 0.005 −0.003 −0.001 −0.003
Arts 0.048*** 0.046 0.012 0.006 −0.005 0 0.003
Professional 0.027*** 0.002 −0.009 0.003 0.007* −0.004 −0.005*
Level 2
Gini index −0.08* 0.163 0.058 −0.005 −0.031 −0.091 0
Education (gross
enrolment ratio)
0.15*** −0.127 −0.025 0.014 −0.016 0.049 −0.001
Cultural trade as %
of GDP
0.02 0.033 0.034 −0.001 0.015 −0.014 −0.003
Intercept 1.324 0.623 0.836 1.998 2.576 2.421 1.583
(St. error) (0.141) (0.859) (0.117) (0.130) (0.527) (1.620) (0.219)
Intra-class correlation 0.18 0.51 0.002 0.04 0.27 0.57 0.02
Variance component
(level 1)
0.201 0.575 1.566 1.998 0.696 1.720 0.667
The values presented are standardized regression coefficients. Level 1 = individual citizen/respondents, data
source: World Values Survey (1999–2004 wave); level 2 = aggregate (nation) level, data source: United Nations
Development Programme and UNESCO. Software: HLM 6.02. N1 minimum=42,625 citizen respondents in 42
countries
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 2 Multilevel regression analysis: predictors of democratic politics (class politics context)
Participation Attitudes Norms of citizenship
Protest Trust: political
institutions
Social
trust
Engaged Duty Solidarity Civic
Level 1
Sex (female) −0.058*** 0.061* 0.038 0.021 0.042** −0.007 −0.031
Age 0 −0.032* 0.027 −0.005 0.029*** −0.011 −0.002
Educational level 0.159*** 0.004 0.041 −0.002 0.019* 0.001 −0.001
Income 0.044*** −0.016 0.012 −0.006 0.023* −0.029* −0.006
Community 0.012* −0.011 −0.001 −0.010 0.002 −0.004 −0.011
Religious −0.018* 0.037 −0.024 0.007 −0.002 −0.011 −0.011
Arts 0.024*** 0.011 −0.008 0.005 −0.003 −0.002 0.005
Professional 0.012* −0.009 −0.013 −0.001 0.007 0.005 −0.009*
Level 2
Gini index −0.023* 0.036 0.022 −0.051 −0.015 −0.022 0.018
Education (gross
enrolment ratio)
0.08 −0.012 −0.050 0.072 −0.017 0.165 −0.017
Cultural trade as %
of GDP
0.05 0.035 0.070 0.015 0.043 −0.001 −0.009
Intercept 1.639 1.257 0.918 1.837 2.094 1.785 1.698
(St. error) (0.157) (1.035) (0.143) (0.137) (0.334) (1.764) (0.222)
Intra-class correlation 0.18 0.61 0.02 0.04 0.27 0.64 0.20
Variance component
(level 1)
0.201 0.558 1.569 0.475 0.689 1.694 0.667
Table 1 notes also apply here
Table 3 Social participation predicting representative democracy component (OLS regression)
NPC Class politics Protestant Catholic
Sex (female) −0.035*** (−6.254) −0.007 (−1.376) 0.041*** (−6.370) −0.056*** (−8.498)
Age 0.255*** (43.799) 0.274*** (48.824) 0.193*** (18.214) 0.156*** (16.435)
Highest level of
education attained
0.081*** (12.681) 0.094*** (15.493) −0.002 (−0.250) 0.021* (2.267)
Income −0.004 (−0.672) −0.010 (−1.095) 0.049*** (8.809) 0.001 (0.224)
Self-positioning in
political scale
0.005 (0.730) 0.038*** (6.041) −0.080*** (−5.363) −0.096*** (−7.604)
Religious −0.020*** (−3.338) −0.001 (−0.177) −0.036*** (−3.513) −0.018* (−2.041)
Arts 0.048*** (7.818) 0.074*** (12.548) 0.051*** (5.133) −0.028*** (−3.211)
Constant 1,488 1,379 1,739 1,755
Adj. R square 0.075 0.104 0.021 0.008
The values presented are standardized coefficients for OLS regression analysis. T statistics in parentheses.
Pairwise deletion was applied to missing values. Vote is an index composed by the following variables: voted
in last election and political action: attend political meetings or rally. Source: International Social Survey
Programme (2004)
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Silva et al.
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